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n.1 Introduction 
Etiquette gets a bad rap. Theorists sometimes claim that etiquette is merely formally normative 
whereas morality is substantively normative: that morality is normatively special in some way 
which eludes requirements of mere manners.2 Some theorists flavor these claims with the 
etiquette norms of our grandparents and moral norms of pressing contemporary interest. It’s 
hard, in the face of this, to do much but nod along. Who could seriously think that wearing pants 
to dinner was in any way on a par with treating others with compassion? 
     I do. There’s at least one important sense of normativity which is shared by both morality and 
etiquette. Both explain a distinctive kind of normative reason for action in virtue of their being  
standards we take seriously. I’ll call these reasonsδ for action where δ ranges over standards such 
as etiquette, morality, or even the norms of pool.3 Reasonsδ come from our normative reasons to 
respect δ as a standard governing our behavior. They are different from the ‘institutional 
reasons’ which are part of systems of norms (Joyce 2001: §2.1)—etiquette might ‘say’ that we 
have decisive reason to ψ, but we might only have weak reason to ψ as we only have weak 
reason to respect etiquette. Reasonsδ are also independent of instrumental reasons to obey 
standards—we can have instrumental reason to obey any standard of correctness, regardless of 
                                                1	Thanks	to	(at	least)	Derek	Baker,	Mitch	Berman,	Jamie	Dreier,	Gerald	Lang,	Errol	Lord,	Zoë	Johnson-King,	Barry	Maguire,	Tristram	McPherson,	Erum	Naqvi,	Geoffrey	Sayre-McCord,	Lucas	Thorpe,	Pekka	Väyrynen,	Robbie	Williams,	Ken	Westphal,	Daniel	Wodak,	and	Gözde	Yıldırım	for	useful	discussions	of	this	material	and	to	audiences	at	the	Uppsala	Language	and	Metaphysics	of	Normativity	conference,	the	Chapel	Hill	Metaethics	Workshop,	Bilkent	University,	and	Normativity	in	Action	II	for	useful	feedback.	
2	For	recent	articulations,	see	Ridge	(2011:	93),	Parfit	(2011:	144),	Broome	(2013:	26).		
3	I	focus	on	practical	standards,	though	my	considerations	also	apply	to	epistemic	standards.	See	Maguire	and	Woods	(manuscript).	
  
our relationship with the standard. Reasonsδ instead capture how our relationship with certain 
standards makes an important normative difference to what we ought, all-things-considered, do.   
     Some standards, like morality, might also fully explain unsubscripted normative reasons for 
action. This property—which I’ll call intrinsic reason-providingness—is what I take 
substantiveness to be. My aim, though, isn’t to investigate whether morality or etiquette are 
intrinsically reason-providing, but rather to explain how morality and etiquette yield structurally 
identical reasonsδ because of our intimate relation with morality and etiquette as important 
standards for us.  
     My view is that certain standards become normatively important because we treat them as 
guides to practical behavior. When this happens, I’ll say these standards are in force for us. I’ll 
argue that we then have reason to respect their norms exactly because they’re in force standards 
for us. These reasons to respect norms in turn explain reasonsδ for action. Both morality and 
etiquette are treated by us as guides to practical behavior, so in terms of reasonsδ, there’s no 
structural difference between morality and etiquette. As I’ll say, both are formally normative 
standards. 
     I highlight this symmetry of morality and etiquette, but I don’t insist that morality isn’t 
substantive.4 My sneaky hope is that the picture I’ll paint below suggests that the existence of 
substantive obligations is unnecessary.5 But the primary aim is developing a detailed account of 
the normative character of formally normative standards. In my view, formal normativity is 
under-explored because of the temptation to treat merely formal standards as arbitrary standards 
of correctness. But they are so much more than that. 
     I open by arguing that morality and etiquette share a type of normativity not possessed by all  
standards. I then give more particulars about standards and their relationship to other normative 
notions (in §n.2). Returning to formal normativity in §n.3, I claim our actual formal standards 
                                                4	For	compelling	reasons	to	reject	substantive	obligations,	see	Williams	(1979)	and	Copp	(2004).		
5	To	be	honest,	slightly	less	sneaky	now.		
  
aren’t escapable even when there are reasons to act against them, using this fact to evidence 
standards being in force for us, and develop an account of standards being ‘in force’ drawing on 
these claims. This sets up the discussion of reasonsδ  as the characteristic normative oomph of 
formal standards (in §n.4). I dismiss two worries for my account: one involving the genericity of 
reasons, the other fetishism, and close by suggesting that my account may undermine the 
grounds for believing in substantive normativity at all.  
 
n.2 Normative Structure and the ‘Sch-’ Challenge 
Why think that there’s a further distinction between formal normativity and mere standards of 
correctness? It’s tempting to just collapse these two. This temptation is aggravated by what I’ve 
come to think of as the ‘sch-’ challenge.6 Let schmorality be a system of norms covering the 
same field of actions as morality, but slightly differing on its verdicts about what to do. 
Intuitively, violations of the schmorality standard aren’t important, but schmorality’s 
nevertheless a standard of correctness: we can be good and bad schmoralizers. Just as intuitively, 
violations of morality are important—being immoral isn’t merely incorrect. What explains this 
difference? What’s so special about morality?7 
     The problem with the ‘sch-’ challenge is that it misleadingly suggests the only important 
division between standards puts morality and like intuitively substantive standards on one side 
and the rest on the other. But this is incorrect. Happily, we can turn the ‘sch-‘ challenge into a 
demonstration of this conflation. Let schmetiquette be a system of norms covering the same 
territory as etiquette, but slightly differing on its verdicts about what to do. Intuitively, violations 
of the schmetiquette standard aren’t important—schmetiquette’s a mere standard of correctness. 
Just as clearly, violations of etiquette are a serious matter—not tipping isn’t merely incorrect. 
What explains this difference? What’s so special about etiquette? 
                                                6	The	‘sch-’	challenge	crops	up	in	different	guises,	but	it	should	be	recognizable	to	the	reader.	
7	For	discussion,	see	McPherson	(2011)	and	works	cited	within.	Note	that	McPherson	analogizes	chess	with	schmess	and	schmeasons	in	exactly	this	misleading	way.	
  
     The problem is that there are potentially three types of standards here: mere standards of 
correctness, like schmetiquette and schmorality, which aren’t important to us and aren’t 
intrinsically reason-providing; merely formal standards, like pool rules, the law, and etiquette, 
which are important but are not intrinsically reason-providing; and substantive standards, like 
morality perhaps, which are important and intrinsically reason-providing. I haven’t yet said what 
it is for a standard to be important to us (more on this below) but the idea is clear enough—we 
take both morality and etiquette seriously.  
     The original ‘sch-’ challenge runs roughshod over this threeway difference by suggesting the 
sole important normative difference is between substantive standards and the rest. But 
schmorality, schmetiquette, and etiquette shouldn’t be classed together. Etiquette is a normative 
standard which we take seriously, schmorality and schmetiquette unimportant standards of 
correctness. Even if etiquette isn’t intrinsically reason-providing, it’s still a part of our normative 
outlook. We regard violations of etiquette as sufficient for criticizability; we regard etiquette as 
giving us reasons to be polite. This feature of both etiquette and morality isn’t possessed by 
schmorality or schmetiquette: morality and etiquette are important to us as normative standards 
whereas sch-standards aren’t.8  
     So there are two potential differences between morality and schmorality: substantiveness and 
whether they’re important to us. Since the latter difference is also shared between etiquette and 
schmetiquette, the ‘sch-’ challenge provides little reason to think that morality is special in a way 
that etiquette and the rules of games are not. Rather, it gives significant reason to think that both 
morality and etiquette are special in a way that schmorality and schmetiquette are not. The ‘sch-’ 
challenge shows that we need an explanation of the difference between both merely formal and 
putatively substantive standards and those standards of correctness which aren’t even formal 
norms. We turn to this shortly after giving a more detailed picture of standards.  
                                                8	This	point	isn’t	novel,	but	its	importance	has	been	downplayed.	See	the	discussions	of	rule-implying	normativity	in	Parfit	(2011)	and	Broome	(2013)	(see	below	for	why	‘reason-implying’	isn’t	the	right	property.)	
  
 
n.2.1 Subscripted Obligations 
The standards we’re interested in—morality, etiquette, correct pool playing—arise from systems 
of norms.9 For our purposes here, a system of norms is any collection of demands, permissions, 
and forbiddings of actions, as well as favorings and disfavorings of the same. System of norms 
underwrite our target standards of correctness—being in accordance with or variance with the 
norms. We typically lexicalize this correctness property when the standard is one we care about:  
 morally upstandingness, politeness, rationality. These are gradable properties: one can be more 
or less morally upstanding, polite, or rational, though we sometimes use these terms to indicate 
being perfectly correct.  
     Often the exact character of a system of norms isn’t always clear to those taking the 
corresponding property seriously. Morally upstandingness is important to us even though it’s 
unclear to many of us what being morally upstanding requires. It’s correspondingly difficult to 
carve systems of norms apart precisely, but in practice we can generally distinguish them—we 
have little trouble distinguishing what morality requires from, say, what etiquette requires. 
     System of norms themselves may consist entirely of forbiddings and permissions with no 
non-trivial favoring and disfavorings, like legal systems of norms.10 They may consist entirely of 
favorings and disfavorings where we concoct forbiddings and permissions in terms of what’s 
most favored, as we find in culinary norms. They may consist entirely of rough aims which 
underwrite favorings and disfavorings, forbiddings and permissions. Finally, they might be 
entirely particularistic, having no explicit rules or aims, but where we have a sense of which 
things are favored, disfavored, forbidden, and permitted. Any of these can be massaged into 
standard of correctness. 
                                                9	I’ll	generally	default	to	talking	about	standards,	instead	of	the	system	of	norms	that	underwrite	them	or	the	obligations	that	standard	induces.	This	should	cause	no	confusion.		
10	‘Non-trivial’	since	we	can	cook	up	favorings	and	disfavorings	given	a	system	of	forbiddings	and	permissions	by	claiming	disfavor	of	anything	we’re	forbidden	from	doing,	favorings	to	avoid	doing	anything	we’re	forbidden	from	not	doing,	etc.	
  
     Consider the rules of tic-tac-toe. One is permitted to mark any open square on one’s turn. One 
is forbidden from making two moves at once. A mark is an ‘X’ or an ‘O’; each player may only 
have one mark. Player X marks with ‘X’, Player O marks with ‘O’. A win is a configuration of 
the board where there are three consecutive ‘X’s or ‘O’s. A player is the winner if their mark 
makes a win; all other players are losers. A draw is a full configuration of the board which is not 
a win. The aim of play is to configure the board into a win; a move is favored insofar as it 
advances this goal. And so on. This is only a partial spelling out of the permissions, forbiddings, 
favorings and disfavorings of a game so notoriously simple as tic-tac-toe, but it’s enough to see 
what correct tic-tac-toe play is.  
     Standards of correctness play a fundamental role in the the orthodox semantics for ought. On 
this account, background information, such as a contextually-salient standard, ranks ways things 
could go in terms of how well they accord with it.11 We oughtδ do something just in case the 
contextually salient ranking places ways in which I do it above worlds in which I don’t. This 
semantic story is fully compatible with every standard being substantive, none being substantive, 
and any mediate position. Since we can raise any standard to contextual salience with sufficient 
background information, we won’t find any difference in normativity between our three types of 
standards in terms of the semantics of ‘ought’ or ‘obligation’.12,13 Standards and induced notions 
of ‘ought’ are cheap; the interesting normative questions lie elsewhere.14 
     Consider again our trivial example of tic-tac-toe. We oughtttt block any two-consecutive 
pattern unless we can win immediately by playing elsewhere. And the tic-tac-toe standard might 
                                                11	See	(Kratzer	1977)	for	origins	of	this	account	and	(Chrisman	2015,	ch.	2-5)	for	an	overview	from	a	philosophical	standpoint	and	details.	We	sidestep	worries	arising	from	differences	in	the	various	flavors	of	‘ought’	since,	in	the	cases	under	consideration,	they	are	all	more	or	less	agentive	‘oughts’	with	different	ordering	sources.	12	I	use	‘substantive’	and	‘formal’	for	both	standards	and	the	obligations	they	induce.	I’ll	likewise	not	carefully	distinguish	between	‘ought’	and	‘obligation’.		
13	For	the	cognoscenti:	I’m	running	rough-shod	over	a	number	of	important	semantical	difference	between	‘ought’,	‘must’,	‘should’,	and	their	connection	to	obligations.	I’m	also	leaving	unspecified	many	important	issues	in	the	metasemantics	of	‘ought’.	These	details	aren’t	important	for	my	point	and	the	details	are	contentious,	so	let	it	go.	
14	I	think	it’s	natural	to	treat	the	obligations	true	in	a	context	as	plenitudinous	so	that	right	now	I	oughtskippedy-do	ψ,	etc.	If	more	restrictive	accounts	are	wanted,	I	trust	the	reader	can	make	the	obvious	adjustments.	
  
be contextually salient. Yet this is insufficient for normative reason to satisfy these obligations—
so what if we’re obligedttt to play a particular way? If, following Parfit (2011), we treat the issue 
of genuine normativity in terms of reasons, then we should look to connections to normative 
reasons in order to distinguish formal and substantive standards from mere standards of 
correctness.  
 
n.2.2 Generic Reasons 
In order to do this, we need to make use of something like a generic sense of reason or ought.15 
What these notions are is, of course, a matter of substantive philosophical dispute. As is what it 
is to act in a way which is based on them. I’ll abstract from these worries here, intending a 
broadly ecumenical picture of generic normative notions and how we can base our actions on 
them. I’ll briefly argue in favor of the existence and non-emptiness of these notions shortly. 
     I’ll use reasons-talk below, though I’m strictly agnostic on whether (generic) reasons or 
(generic) oughts are more fundamental. The reason for my agnosticism is that we can interdefine 
these notions. Starting with generic normative reasons, we generically ought to do what we have 
most reason to do. Starting with generic oughts, we have generic reason to do as we ought.16 
     We can flesh out these connections in different ways. Perhaps value is explanatorily 
fundamental in grounding our generic reasons (Maguire 2016). Then we generically ought to do 
the value-maximizing things.17 Perhaps desire explains generic reasons. If so, we generically 
ought to do those things which are maximally desire satisfying. Even if there are multiple, 
                                                15	See	Baker	(this	volume)	for	worries	about	the	existence	of	these	kinds	of	flat	notions.	The	position	I	construct	below	concedes	many	of	his	worries	while	avoiding	his	charge	of	“changing	the	subject”.	See	Finlay	(forthcoming)	for	discussion	of	exactly	what	the	subject	is.		
16	This	latter	reduction	requires	complications	involving	weighing	reasons.	As	I	prefer	generic	reasons,	I	won’t	worry	about	this.	
17	Maximization	is	a	simplification;	substitute	your	favored	weaker	notion	if	you	like.		
  
equally fundamental, grounds for our reasons, then we can construct a partial generic ought in 
terms of what these reasons all agree upon. 
     I don’t care which underlying story we tell about generic reasons and oughts. All I care is that 
there are recognizable and suitably related generic notions of ‘reason’ and ‘ought’ which, if they 
existed, would serve to ‘close deliberation’ (Schroeder 2011) and structure our ordinary practical 
deliberations.18 My task is not to defend the existence of such notions, but a few remarks might 
help to see where I’m coming from.19  
     Our practical deliberation typically proceeds by means of subscripted normative notions 
(Tiffany 2007). Starting with reasons, we talk about what prudence favors, what morality favors, 
and the like. It seems, though, that no matter which norms we invoke, we can always ask 
whether we should do what they jointly favor. In other words, constructions like: 
 
(OQR1)             Morality favors doing it, but should I do it? 
(OQR2)            Morality and Prudence favor doing it, but should I do it? 
(OWR3)   Morality, Prudence, and Etiquette favor doing it, but should I do it? 
 
always seem reasonable, no matter which named systems of norms we stack before ‘but’. In each 
case, I’m asking what I have most reason to do given the listed facts preceding the ‘but’. I take 
the generic notion of a reason to be the limit of ‘should’ in the OQR sequence. If that’s right, 
then it’s extremely plausible we recognize a coherent generic normative notion, like generic 
reasons, in making sense of OQR in its various instances. 
                                                18	Baker	(this	volume)	claims	that	the	notion	of	generic	obligation	is	too	vague	and	metaphorical	to	do	its	characteristic	work.	I	disagree;	there	may	be	no	such	oughts	(Copp	2004,	Tiffany	2007),	but	it’s	manifest	that	we	presume	there	are	such	in	our	practical	deliberations.	
19	McPherson	(this	volume)	takes	steps	towards	a	plausible	defense.	Steve	Finlay	(2014)	offers	an	interpretation	of	all-things-considered	ought	judgments	that	fits	nicely	with	the	sort	of	picture	I’m	sketching	here.	
  
     In further defense, note that many normative conflicts seem easily resolvable.20 If all my 
subscripted reasons, except for my penchant for elegance, direct me to do something, it seems 
clear that I should. This is easily explained with the existence of generic reasons or oughts; it 
seems nearly impossible to explain otherwise, especially as we complicate the case to get deep 
systematic conflicts between systems of norms. Our taking many of these questions to have 
determinate answers is significant evidence that there really are generic normative notions.21 
    One could claim that ways of making sense of conflict resolution differ between contexts and 
sets of subscripted norms (Baker, personal correspondence, this volume). This, however, itself 
demands an explanation; such explanations can typically be massaged into an explanation of 
generic reasons. For example, suppose the value of resolving the conflict a particular way breaks 
ties. This suggests grounding generic reasons in value. Such explanations are far more elegant 
and theoretically satisfying than explanations denying any systematic understanding of the 
‘should’ in each OQR. 
     Does presuming generic reasons concede that there are substantive formal obligations? Not 
exactly. The ‘ought’ constructed out of generic reasons is distinct from a subscripted ought. To 
see this, consider taking what we’ve generic reason to do as a particular system of norms: call 
the resulting standard “practicality”. We could then sensibly ask questions about what we 
oughtpractical do that seem incoherent when we don’t “standarize” generic reasons, like “why 
should I do what I have most reason to do?” So to play their characteristic role generic reasons 
shouldn’t be treated as just one standard among others. That is, they are plausibly not a 
subscripted bit of normativity in the relevant sense. Anyways, if I’m mistaken and we can and 
should treat generic reason and oughts as the sole substantive standard, that isn’t a large cost to 
my view as my target is the normativity of non-generic oughts like morality and etiquette. 
 
                                                20	Dorsey	(2013)	makes	a	compelling	case	for	this	theoretical	virtue	of	generic	reasons.	
21	Generic	reasons	shouldn’t	arbitrate	all	conflicts	between	systems	of	norms	as	sometimes	our	reasons	really	are	just	on	a	par	(Chang	2012).	
  
n.2.3 Summary: Norms: Substantive and Formal 
Summing up, I’ve said that systems of norms give rise to gradable standards of correctness. Each 
standard δ yields a notion of what we oughtδ to do—act as δ demands. What then would it be for 
δ to be substantive? 
     I view the best explication of substantiveness as holding that a standard δ is substantive 
insofar as oughtδ facts totally explain generic reason to do as δ demands.  Then, according to 
(my cashing out of) myth and legend, that I oughtmoral do something totally explains generic 
reason to do it; that I oughtetiquette not so much.22 I believe, but won’t insist, that there are no 
substantive obligations in this sense—myth and legend is just that. 
     Why ‘explains’ as oppose to ‘implies’? After all, Parfit (2011) treats the question of 
substantiveness in terms of a distinction between a rule-implying sense of obligation (etiquette 
and rules of games) and a reason-implying sense (morality and prudence). This, however, does a 
serious disservice to the idea that various normative domains are special. Let Γ be a set of norms 
such that if we have non-instrumental reason to do something, we oughtΓ do it. On the common 
presumption that non-instrumental reasons are necessary, that we oughtΓ do something will 
imply that we have reason to do it. Yet Γ is intuitively not substantive. 
     The problem is that entailment is cheap.23 A domain like Γ can entail that we have reasons 
even though Γ plays no role explaining in why we have reasons. It might merely necessarily 
                                                22	A	referee	worries	that	it’s	more	natural	to	say	morality	is	substantive	because	our	obligation	to	be	moral	is	totally	explained	by	our	generic	reasons.	Presumably	the	idea	is	that	we	necessarily	have	non-instrumental	generic	reason	to	be	moral.	This	view	strikes	me	as	strange—presumably	we	don’t	cordon	off	morality	by	what	we	have	necessary	generic	reason	to	do.	Especially	since	we	may	have	intuitively	non-moral,	yet	necessary,	generic	reason	to	act	towards	each	other	in	various	ways.	Perhaps	prudence	or	politics	furnishes	such	reasons.	This	suggests	that	any	non-foot-stampy	explanation	of	how	morality	is	substantive	will	make	use	of	features	of	the	moral	standard	itself.	But,	given	that	explanation	is	transitive,	this	means	that	that	our	generic	reasons	are	in	turn	explained	by	morality.		
23	No	ought	claim	logically	entails	a	reason	claim	unless	‘ought’,	’reason’,	and	the	bridge-principles	connecting	them	are	themselves	of	logical	character.	Inspection	of	the	standard	semantics	for	‘ought’	mentioned	above	bears	out	that	this	is	implausible	and	unnecessary.	At	best,	the	connection	between	substantive	obligations	and	reasons	is	conceptual	or	metaphysical.	
  
track our generic reasons.24 But theorists should want morality to be substantive in a stronger 
sense; they should want the fact that morality says ‘ψ!’ to explain, by itself, reason to ψ. This 
would be a type of substantiveness worth its salt. 
     We can have many types of generic reason to act as δ demands: instrumental reason—I’d 
rather not act incorrectly for various reasons—as well as independent reason to ψ regardless of 
what δ says. And, of course, the distinctive class of reasonsδ I’ll explain shortly. None of these 
are sufficient for substantiveness since (a) they aren’t explained totally by oughtδ facts and (b) 
we have such reasons for etiquette as well as morality. 
     If morality is substantive, then there will be generic reasons to ψ which are totally explained 
by the fact that I oughtmoral ψ. But there will also be reasonsmoral to act morally; the explanation of 
these reasons is entirely analogous to our reasons to act politely. Morality, that is, is also 
formally normative. Distinguishing mere standards of correctness from formal norms giving rise 
to these distinctive reasons will occupy the next section. 
 
n.3 Formal Obligations: What’s Wrong with Schemtiquette 
I’ve characterized substantive standards as those standards which are intrinsically (generic) 
reason providing. But we can’t characterize formal standards nearly as neatly. I agree with 
philosophical consensus that obligations of etiquette don’t totally explain generic reasons to act 
as etiquette directs. It’s only in tandem with reason to do as I oughtetiquette that the fact that I 
oughtetiquette ψ explains why I’ve generic reason to ψ. Of course, that I oughtschmetiquette would 
likewise explain that I’ve generic reason to be scholite with appropriate background factors. 
     It’s tempting to distinguish formal standards from mere standards of correctness by whether 
there are any reasons obey them, but we shouldn’t. There can be reasons, instrumental or 
intrinsic, to do as a mere correctness condition demands. Perhaps we’ve reasons to obey 
                                                24	See	McPherson	(2011:	236)	makes	a	complementary	point	against	Scanlon’s	metanormative	quietism.	The	problem	is	that	we	might	have	necessary	coincidence	between	what	a	substantive	normative	standard	demands	and	what	Hades	currently	wants;	yet	intuitively	the	Hades	standard	isn’t	“robustly	normative.”	
  
schemtiquette because of its nose-snubbing charm. Nevertheless, schemtiquette is not a standard 
that’s important to us. Etiquette, in contrast, is the way that we do things; it’s an important 
standard for us. It’s this contrast that we need to zoom in on to distinguish formal standards from 
mere standards of correctness. 
 
n.3.1 The Inescapability of Formal Obligation 
The key to distinguishing formally normative standards from mere standards of correctness is the 
fact that formal obligations aren’t escapable even when we have decisive reason to disobey them. 
In particular, others are in a position to criticize and upbraid us for breaking our formal 
obligations, no matter why we broke them. Whereas, when we have no reason—instrumental, 
intrinsic, or whatever—to obey a mere standards of correctness, then it plays no role in our 
practical behavior and doesn’t license criticism. We’ll evidence this by looking closer at some of 
our formal systems of norms: promissory, legal, and etiquette norms. 
     Plausible accounts of promises allow us to promises to do things which we pretty clearly 
ought not all-things-considered do. We might promise to do away with the person who cut in 
line, we might promise to pursue our mother’s campaign of total world domination. Are these 
promises obligatory in the promissory sense? Intuitively and as I’ve argued elsewhere, yes 
(Woods 2016). We seem promissorily obliged to keep immoral promises—that’s how the 
promise game is played. If we fail to do so, some criticism on the behalf of the promisee is 
licensed by our acceptance of promissory norms even when, on balance, our reasons favor 
breaking our promise. 
     Similarly, consider perjury. Suppose I’m in a position to perjure myself to put a horrible 
criminal away for a crime they obviously and clearly did. Suppose the risks of being caught are 
low, it would be a real service to society, etc. It seems plausible that I have all-things-considered 
reason to perjure myself.25  Nevertheless, if I’m punished for perjury, I can’t complain that I did 
                                                25	For	a	good	case	of	this,	consider	Omar	Little’s	testimony	against	Bird	in	The	Wire.	
  
nothing wrong. After all, I broke the law. I can, of course, complain that the law stinks, that it 
should be changed, and it shouldn’t be enforced. These, though, are quite different complaints.26  
     Finally and famously, our etiquette obligations likewise don’t lapse even when we are 
indifferent to or should break them. As Foot put it, both morality and etiquette 
 ...are inescapable in that behavior does not cease to offend against either morality or  
 etiquette because the agent is indifferent to their purposes and to the disapproval he will  
 incur by outing them. (Foot 1972, p. 311) 
 
For example, though it’s laudable and maybe even morally required that we cease using 
gendered norms of polite address, we are currently formally criticizable for so doing. 
     People are within their rights to criticize someone for violating these norms. Rudeness is 
rudeness, even when warranted, and we can’t respond to a charge of particular rudeness except 
by giving reasons to violate the norm in this context; even then, the critic has legitimate grounds 
for complaint, even if it’s overly pedantic, obnoxious, or even immoral to actually criticize 
someone for doing so. That’s what it is for us to treat a standard as our standard.27 
     Contrast the cases just described with standards not in force for us. Suppose we see people 
moving chess pieces around on a board and we correct a seemingly illicit play. The players can 
respond that they’re playing checkers with chess pieces. This would be a complete defense 
against our criticism. Likewise, suppose our annoying uncle upbraids us for wearing pants to 
dinner. Again, pointing out that that it’s customary to wear pants to dinner is a complete defense. 
     For standards like legality, etiquette, and promising, it’s typically bizarre to respond to this 
kind of criticism with the claim that you are not subject to these norms. We can say “I don’t care 
about being polite” or “I reject your bourgeois lifestyle!”, of course, but there is a strong residue 
                                                26	A	referee	complains	that	this	suggests	Rosa	Parks	was	obliged,	in	some	subscripted	sense,	to	sit	in	the	back	of	the	bus	(and	that	she	was	criticizable	for	not	doing	so.)	This,	again,	is	a	feature,	not	a	bug.	Rosa	Parks	is	liable	to	criticism	for	violating	a	norms	presumably	in	force	then	(see	discussion	of	liability	below.)	She	also	had	overwhelming	reason	to	break	this	obligations	and	anyone	actually	leveling	criticism	at	her	for	doing	so	would	be	doing	something	seriously	immoral.	She’s	not	criticism-worthy,	in	other	words.		
27	Details	vary,	of	course.	In	some	contexts,	I	should	sanction	someone	indirectly	for	being	rude,	perhaps	by	complaining	about	their	behavior	to	someone	else.	Elsewhere,	I	should	tell	them	to	their	face.		
  
of strangeness. Criticism of us for violating politeness norms is licensed by our acceptance of 
politeness norms as our norms. Whether we have reason to be polite is another matter; we might 
not. Still, we’ve acted rudely.28 We can object when someone points out that we have violated 
some mere standard of correctness; ‘what’s schmetiquette to us’ is a complete defense.29 
     The distinction between formal norms and mere standards of correctness has to do with 
whether and when they are in force for us, as evidenced by their inescapability: when they are in 
force, we are bound by them. When they are not, we are not. Our next task will be to characterize 
what it is for a standard to be in force. 
 
n.3.2 When Norms are in Force: The Internal Point of View 
There are two obvious ways that standards can fail to be in force. First, they might not be part of 
our normative outlook. Schemtiquette, for instance, plays no part in structuring our practical 
behavior. Second, they might structure our practical behavior, but only somehow, somewhere, 
somewhen. Rules of games are like this, as are legal norms, bits of etiquette, and possibly 
morality (many of us think morality takes no stand on the color of my shoelaces.) 
     Chess norms apply when playing chess. We needn’t comply with such norms unless we’re 
engaged in the activity they govern and we need not so engage. This shouldn’t obscure the sense 
in which we are bound by formal norms when we are engaged in their target activity. We don’t 
get out of our obligation to move our bishop only diagonally because we didn’t want to play 
chess in the first place. We’re playing chess and when playing chess, chess norms are in force. 
When we break these norms, we are criticizable on this basis. 
     Legal norms, in contrast, apply more broadly, but only in particular contexts. I am bound to 
obey British law given my UK residency, but not once I move back to the US. Similarly with 
                                                28	We	can,	of	course,	object	to	someone	invoking	norms	we’re	subject	to	for	other	reasons.	Actually	invoking	certain	rights	we	have	can	be	immoral,	pedantic,	cruel,	and	politically	dangerous.	This	is	yet	another	reason	that	criticism	of	Rosa	Parks	was	awful,	even	if	licensed	by	in	force	norms.		
29	This	doesn’t	mean	that	we’re	immune	to	criticism	for	being	imschmolite.	Such	criticism	needs,	though,	to	be	grounded	in	independent	reason	to	avoid	imschmoliteness.	
  
etiquette: I am permitted, but not required, to tip in a pub. I am required, when tipping, to say 
something like ‘get one for yourself’, not just leaving money on the bar. When I violate these 
norms, fellow members of my British community have the right to snigger at me. When in the 
US, I ought tip. Not doing so legitimates significantly stronger sanctions than just sniggers. 
      These considerations about applicability and inescapability limn what it is for a standard to 
be in force, but they don’t yet explain it. So we need to explain how formal standards yield“real” 
obligations. To do so, I’ll draw on Hart’s idea of an internal point of view: 
 [F]or it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an observer who does  
 not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses them as  
 guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the ‘external’ and the ‘internal points  
 of view.’ (Hart 1961: 89) 
The internal point of view involves at least taking a system of rules to guide our practical 
deliberations.30 In his postscript, Hart explains ‘accepts’:   
 [Acceptance of rules] consists in the standing disposition of individuals to take such  
 patterns of conduct both as guides to their own future conduct and as standards of   
 criticism which may legitimate demands and various forms of pressure…” (Hart 1961) 
and this, in combination with the above, suggests that the internal point of view involves taking a 
system of norms as generating ‘live’ obligations in the sense described above.  
     We’ll say that norms are in force for us when we—qua social group—take the internal point 
of view towards them.31 The pluralized pronoun is important; being in force is a relationship 
                                                30	An	anonymous	reviewer	worries	that	it	only	need	be	legal	officials	who	take	the	internal	point	of	view	for	Hart.	This	is	correct,	but	unworrisome	as	I’m	only	drawing	inspiration	from	Hart.	Hart’s	position	is	that	legal	officials	must	take	the	internal	point	of	view	and	that	this	is	enough	to	undermine	Austinian	pictures	of	legal	validity.	Nevertheless,	it’s	clear	that	Hart	allows	that	we	non-officials	can	also	use	the	law	to	guide	our	practical	deliberations	in	the	relevant	sense—these	are	well-functioning	legal	systems	(and	ones	I’d	take	to	be	clearly	formally	normative.)	Moreover,	even	when	we	don’t	take	the	internal	point	of	view	to	the	law,	in	my	view	we	need	to	treat	certain	folks—the	“officials”—as	in	a	position	to	set	the	law	in	order	for	it	to	be	formally	normative	for	us.	This	complication—vindication	of	the	internal	point	of	view	from	one	remove—isn’t	crucial	for	my	picture,	so	I’ll	bracket	it	for	now.	
31	See	Shapiro	(2006;	2011:	95-98)	for	useful	discussion.	See	Dorsey	(2013)	for	critical	discussion	of	the	analogy	between	legality	and	other	normative	domains.	My	(2016)	goes	into	detail	on	the	legal	analogy;	in	particular,	I	there	discuss	how	to	use	something	akin	to	rules	of	recognition	and	adjudication	to	determinately	fix	the	extension	of	conventional	normative	standards.	
  
between a social group qua social group and the norms it accepts, though exploring the details of 
this must wait for another occasion.32 Even if I’ve reason to violate legal norms, I’m open to 
being punished for so doing because we (a we of which I’m a part) view the pronouncements of 
judges as legitimate on the matter. I may disagree with us, but no matter. Even though I’m part 
of the legitimators, I need not agree entirely with them in order for our view to be that the judge 
fixes my liability to punishment. 
     Connecting up our earlier discussion with the internal point of view, we’ll say standards get 
their status as formal standards when violations are taken to license criticism and where we take 
this criticism seriously in the sense of being a sanction. Criticism need not involve putting 
someone in the stocks. Hart recognized this early on:  
 rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing obligations when the general demand for  
 conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate or  
 threaten to deviate is great.          (Hart 61: 84)   
 
As suggested by Hart, in many cases, explicit recognition of violations is sanction enough. 
Consider someone pointing out failure to vote, rudeness, or unsporting behavior. It’s 
embarrassing for the gross majority of us to be pulled up on such charges.33 
     When we are part of a social group that takes these norms seriously—which is, again, to take 
them as licensing sanction like blame and criticism—then they are in force for us. It’s important 
to be clear about what this exactly means. First, taking the internal point of view towards a 
standard doesn’t require most individuals taking internal point of view towards particular norms 
that underwriting that standard. We might not know what they are, after all, as is often the case 
                                                32	I’ll	stick	with	intentionally	generic	language	like	‘us	taking	δ	seriously’	and	cognates	below,	but	it	would	be	vastly	preferable	to	give	an	account	in	terms	of	collective	agency	and	group	action	since	it	might	be	that	a	majority	of	society	are	‘bad	[people]’	in	Hart’s	sense	(1961:91).	I	hope	to	revisit	this	issue	elsewhere.		
33	A	reviewer	complains	that	telling	a	gangster	they’re	a	lawbreaker	isn’t	criticism.	I	don’t	think	that’s	right—gangsters	are	typically	part	of	our	community	and	we	take	lawbreaking	seriously	as	a	criticism	of	them,	even	if	they	don’t	seem	to	(obviously,	it’s	not	obvious	that	gangsters	don’t	care	about	the	law	at	all;	normative	psychology	isn’t	behaviorally	transparent.)	If	they’re	appropriately	related	to	legality	being	in	force	for	us	(on	which,	see	below),	they’ll	also	have	reasonslegality	to	obey	the	law.	Alternatively,	if	there	were	enough	socially	independent	gangsters	such	that	they	aren’t	part	of	our	community,	then	presumably	they	wouldn’t	take	our	laws	as	important	for	them.		
  
in the law (see below.) Second, taking the internal point of view towards legal norms isn’t 
treating violation of legal standards—failure to meet our subscripted legal obligations—as 
domain-independent justification for punishing the offender. Justification for applying 
punishment involves additional materials such as the usefulness, morality, and reasonableness of 
punishment. Not every case of sanction-liability is a case of sanction-worthiness—just consider 
jaywalking and minor drug offenses. 
     It’s easy to confuse sanction-liability with sanction-worthiness, but we should avoid doing so. 
Blameworthiness tends to be read as ‘being all-things-considered worthy of blame’. It’s rather 
implausible that every violation of social norms is sanction-worthy in this sense. It’s plausible 
that someone is sanction-liable for doing so. Compare the intuitive distinction between 
prosecution-liability and prosecution-worthiness.34 If, say, I wander over a do-not-cross line 
unmaliciously, then intuitively I am liable for, but not worthy of, prosecution.35 
     It’s thus better to say that a social group takes the internal point of view to systems of norms 
when they treat offenders as being liable for sanction on that basis and view liability to sanction 
as a serious matter.36 If this is right, then norms governing a particular activity ψ are in force 
when we are ψ-ing if a social group we are members of are disposed to regard the subscripted 
obligations grounded by this standard to be serious. That is, when they are disposed treat us as 
liable to sanction because of our behavior with regard to these obligations and treat sanction-
liability as to be avoided.  
                                                34	Daniel	Wodak	suggests	(personal	correspondence)	that	legality	is	special	in	this	regard,	pointing	out	that	it	might	be	always	rude	to	point	out	rudeness.	This	strikes	me	as	an	unfortunate	feature	of	Commonwealth	etiquette;	we	can	be	licensed	to	do	something	which,	in	so	doing,	licenses	comparable	sanction	against	us.		
35	This	is	complicated	by	cases	where	the	hands	of	the	judges	and	police	are	tied,	such	as	three	strike	laws	and	the	like.	See	(Woods	2016	§2).	
36	Hart	(1960)	distinguishes	between	the	justification	of	instances	of	punishment–in	terms	of	a	social	good	being	realized	by	the	practice—and	the	justification	from	within	the	practice	of	punishing	someone—in	terms	of	retributive	considerations.	This	means	we	can	hang	someone	out	to	dry	even	though	it’s	known	to	the	authorities	that	they’re	innocent.	It’s	more	plausible,	in	my	view,		that	there’s	generic	reason	punish	them,	but	they’re	neither	punishment-liable	nor	punishment-worthy.	
  
     Again, this needn’t require having detailed knowledge of when and how to apply these 
sanctions. Even etiquette, a clearly conventional standard, requires advice columnists. Whether a 
system of norms licenses sanction for particular actions is often only loosely grasped at. The 
degree of clarity varies from standard to standard. It’s often roughly clear what’s required to be 
legally upstanding—since we accept the rule of law as a constraint on acceptable legal systems—
but this seems a somewhat special case.37 
     There might not be any corresponding “rule of morality” or “rule of etiquette”. Moral and 
etiquette norms may only be loosely accessible to us. Again, we often focus on the lexicalized 
unspecific properties they ground like moral upstandingness. Don’t confuse our account of in-
force-ness and use of games and legality as examples with commitment to treating morality as 
conventional. The only conventional feature of formal obligations that I’m committing to is that 
our view of certain standards is what gives them formal normativity. This is entirely consistent 
with these standards themselves being fixed by mind-independent properties.38 Likewise, 
regardless of our treatment of reasonsδ, there will likely be non-conventional reasons as well as 
instrumental reasons to do as morality directs. 
     It’s undeniable that many putatively substantive systems of norms, like morality and 
prudence, have sanctions built into them which we take seriously. We regard moral blame as 
serious and take claims about imprudence to guide our behavior. Clearly we also take etiquette, 
rules of games, and many other merely formal standards seriously. So, at least in my defined 
sense of a standard being in force, it seems that both putatively substantive and merely formal 
standards can be and often are in force for us. 
 
                                                37	Of	course,	this	constraint	is	violated	often	in	practice.	Thanks	to	Daniel	Wodak	for	discussion.		
38	How	to	fix	the	content	of	morality	is	a	notoriously	difficult	matter;	I	favor	fixing	it	conventionally,	but	I	recognize	that	I	haven’t	argued	for	that	here.	Stay	tuned	for	future	work	on	this.		
  
n.4 The Distinctive Reasons of Formal Obligation 
Recapping briefly, I’ve argued that norms are in force when we take the obligations they support 
to be real obligations for us, in the sense of licensing sanction for violating these obligations. 
This might range from something like social sanction (etiquette), actual punishment (criminal 
behavior), or mere recognition of being a rule-breaker. I distinguished this sanction-liability from 
sanction-worthiness since license to sanction isn’t justification for so sanctioning. So, formal 
norms are in force when (a) we are engaged in the activity they govern and (b) members of a 
social group who are disposed treat us as liable to sanction when we act as we shouldn’t (by its 
lights) and who are disposed take the sanctions so licensed seriously. 
     We still need one more piece before we can tie this all together into a neat picture of the 
distinctive reasons that come from formal obligations. Consider again that mere standards of 
correctness can, with appropriate background conditions, explain reasons. Schmetiquette can 
explain instrumentally—because it would further an end of ours to be schmolite—or indirectly—
because schmetiquette tracks some other source of reasons. But these aren’t the distinctive 
reasons we’re after. 
 
n.4.1 The Distinctive Reasons of Formal Obligation: Respect-based Reasons 
To isolate reasonsδ, we need that there’s something special about taking standards as giving us 
reasons in their role as our standards. The idea is that we’ve reason to obey δ because δ is in 
force for us. There’s something significant about taking standards to be standards. When we do 
so, we’ll get a particular type of reasons (which I’ll call respect-based reasons) to act out of the 
fact that these norms are in force for us. That’s what’s special about in force standards; they are 
literally guides to behavior in that there are reasons to comply with them in virtue of them being 
our standards. 
     Any account of reasons where that the fact that I desire something yields pro tanto reason to 
do it implies that we have respect-based reasons. This is because what it is for δ to be in force for 
  
us is, partially, for us qua community to regard liability to δ-sanctions as undesirable.39 So we, 
qua community, want (pro tanto) to avoid liability to δ-sanctions. So we’ve reason obey δ in 
order to avoid δ-sanction-liability (this assumes the instrumental principle adumbrated below.)  
This particular explanation turns on desire-based reasons, but this isn’t essential—I hazard that 
on all plausible pictures of generic reasons, we’ll have reason to be both morally upstanding and 
polite because both morality and etiquette are in force for us. 
     Strictly speaking, I’ve only so far explained why we, qua social group, have respect-based 
reason to obey norms. Since individuals don’t have agree with their community about realness of 
δ-obligations in order for δ to be in force, these individuals might not have reason to be obey δ. 
Nevertheless, as a community, we’ve reasons fully explained by the fact that δ is in force for us. 
     Drawing this together, we have respect-based reason to be obey δ when the fact that we have 
reasons to obey δ is fully explained by δ’s being in force for us. Derivatively, an individual will 
have respect-based reason to be obey δ when they’re appropriately related to the fact that δ is in 
force for their community such that this latter fact, in tandem with their relationship to it, fully 
explains their reasons for to obey δ. 
     Being appropriately related will differ with particular accounts of generic reasons. On a 
value-based picture, my membership in the community for which δ is in force might make 
obeying δ valuable, thereby giving me reason to obey δ.40 Perhaps my observance of δ reinforces 
our acceptance of δ as our norms. On desire-based pictures, my respect-based reasons might 
                                                39	Undesirable	in	a	general	sense.	Individuals	will	often	have	more	particular	desires	to	avoid	liability	to	particular	folks	for	particular	infractions.	See	(Woods	2016:	93)	for	discussion.		
40	For	a	useful	example	of	how	to	spell	out	‘appropriately	related’	on	a	value-based	picture,	see	(Scheffler	2017).	Scheffler’s	account	denies	reason	to	act	on	immoral	demands	from	non-moral	standards,	but	this	restriction	can	be	removed	without	additional	cost	to	the	view.		
  
come from my attitudes partially constituting δ being in force for us—that is, from my desire to 
avoid δ-sanction.41 
 
n.4.2 The Distinctive Reasons of Formal Obligation: Reasonsδ 
For our full account of reasonδ, we need a minimal instrumental constraint on generic reasons: 
 INSTRUMENTALISM: If I’ve reason to ψ and φ is a necessary means of ψ-ing, then I’ve  
 correspondingly strong reason to φ.42 
Now, suppose δ is in force for us. We’ll then have respect-based reason to obey δ which are 
totally explained by δ being in force for us. The combination of these reasons and the actual 
contours of δ explain why we have reason to ψ—because ψ-ing is how to obey δ and we have 
respect-based reason to obey δ. Individuals, in turn, will have analogous reason to ψ when 
they’re appropriately related to δ being in force for their community and thereby have derivative 
respect-based reason to obey δ. We now can define the distinctive reasons arising from formal 
obligations, our reasonsδ: 
 REASONSδ: A reasonδ to ψ is a reason to ψ whose weight derives from our   
 respect-based reason to obey δ. 
For example, reasonprudence to sleep derives from my respect-based reason to have prudent 
behavior; its weight is a function of the strength of my respect-based reason to be prudent and 
how imprudent staying awake would be. Staying awake is strongly imprudent so, by 
instrumentalism, insofar as I’ve strong respect-based reason to be prudent, I’ve strong 
reasonprudence to sleep. 
                                                41	See	my	(2016)	for	extended	discussion	of	desire-based	pictures	of	this	type	for	promissory	obligations.	Desire-based	pictures	need	to	avoid	Schroeder’s	“elusive	reasons”	cases	(2007),	but	this	can	be	finessed	by	a	proper	account	of	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	reason	(Sinclair	2016).	
42	Be	careful	here	not	to	confuse	sanctionable—in	the	sense	that	someone	might	actually	sanction	us—with	liability	to	sanction.	Even	if	everyone	thinks	I’m	being	polite,	I	might	be	impolite.	Systems	of	norms	δ	where	there’s	a	referee	with	fancy	illocutionary	powers	complicate	matters,	but	our	reasonδ	are	likewise	complicated	there.	I’m	open	to	complicating	this	principle	for	the	usual	reasons,	but	simplicity	suffices	here.		
  
     Again, reasonsδ differ from so-called “institutional” reasons—a “reason” from “inside” of δ 
(Joyce 2001: §2.1).43 For example, etiquette might say decisively that we shouldn’t play practical 
jokes on friend Fulya. But, given a lack of strong respect-based reason to be polite, we might 
have significantly weaker reasonetiquette to refrain. Poor Fulya. Institutional reasons are not real 
reasons though they approach such when they are backed by appropriately strong respect-based 
reasons. 
     For formal systems of norms δ and γ, our reasonsδ and reasonsγ will be commensurable, on 
standard pictures of generic reasons, as they and their weight come from a single source. On the 
other hand, our respect-based reasons to be obey δ and obey γ might be on a par. We shouldn’t 
expect all formal dilemmas to be resolvable, but we’ll only face the dualism of (formal) reasons 
worried about by Dorsey (2013) and Copp (2004) when we really do face a generically 
normative dilemma. Of course, if some formal systems of norms are also substantive, we may 
still face a dualism involving our substantive reasons.44 We now turn to some closing objections 
to our view of formal normativity. 
 
n.4.2.1 Objection: The Generality of Reasonsδ 
Reasonsmorality are derived from our respect-based reasons to be moral. This raises questions 
about individuation and extension-fixing conditions of moral correctness. After all, substantive 
norms like morality are purported universal, unlike context-sensitive properties like legality. If 
we fix moral correctness by local moral conventions, we’ll have to explain away this intuition.45 
     Luckily, this isn’t a worry for the general picture I’ve painted. I’ve said nothing about how to 
fix the extension of moral correctness. If we do so via conventions, then our reasonsmorality will 
                                                43	See	Schafer	(2016)	for	useful	discussion	of	how	institutional	reasons	of,	say,	morality	can	privilege	prudence	over	itself.	The	topography	of	normative	reasons	becomes	complicated	once	we	take	seriously	the	plurality	of	normative	domains.	
44	The	worry	isn’t	that	substantive	reasons	are	of	different	types;	the	worry	is	that	the	status	of	morality	and	prudence	as	both	substantive	does	nothing	to	explain	the	weight	of	the	reasons	explained	by	each.	
45	This	can	be	done.	See	my	(in	press).		
  
vary from context to context just as our reasonsetiquette clearly do. If not, then many of us make 
mistakes about morality, just as we might do with etiquette and legality when we’re not careful. 
My account is consistent by design with any number of ways of fixing the extension of moral 
correctness. My claim is that our behavior towards the property of being morally upstanding 
makes morality in force for us. If, then, we didn’t take morality seriously we wouldn’t have 
reasonsmorality to act. There might still be generic reasons explained by morality, but there 
wouldn’t be the distinctive reasons of the sort I’m investigating.  
     I don’t worry much about this. We are moralizers, we thereby have distinctively moral 
reasons, and it’s unclear whether we could fail to be moralizers. The possible lack of 
reasonsmorality shouldn’t be terrifying since it’s difficult to understanding what a non-moralizing 
community would even look like (Street 2009). Moreover, we’ll typically have other generic 
reasons to do recognizably moral actions. Being unconcerned with morality doesn’t eradicate our 
sympathy towards other beings, the social benefits of behavior coordination, or the value of 
treating each other fairly. It’s a good result if the distinctively moral character of our reasons is 
bound up with our treatment of morality as a formal normative standard; that’s how moralizing 
feels to many of us. I’ve addressed these  issues in detail elsewhere (2016, in press), so I won’t 
pursue them further here. 
     A more significant problem is how to individuate morality from etiquette and honor codes. I 
cannot address this difficult project here. It’s presumed by the theory I’m offering that there’s a 
way to do this, but, admittedly, it’s not a presumption I’ve made good on. We should, though, be 
optimistic. Even though the borders of etiquette and morality bleed together, we’re typically 
capable of distinguishing paradigmatic cases of each.46 
 
                                                46	A	natural	suggestion	uses	types	of	sanction	to	distinguish	them.	If	there’s	a	distinctive	moralized	form	of	blame,	for	instance,	then	we	can	treat	morality	as	that	which	licenses	morally	blame-liability.	Another	attempt	uses	platitude-first	accounts	of	normativity	familiar	from	Jackson	(1998)	and	Wright	(1992)	to	divide	up	standards.	
  
n.4.3 Norm-fetishism 
Another worry is that my account is rule-fetishistic (Smith 1995).47 As I used respect-based 
reasons to explain reasonsδ, I’ve built on bare concern for being morally upstanding or polite, not 
responsiveness to underlying features of actions that explain why doing such and so is moral or 
not. I shouldn’t want to care to save my partner from dying because it’s morally right; rather, I 
should be responsive to the moral-making features of saving my partner. Saving my partner 
because (de dicto) it’s the right thing to do is somehow objectionable. 
     This objection misunderstands my account. I took no stand on moral motivation. Correctly 
acting on morality might involve responsiveness to underlying features which make it moral. All 
I’ve claimed is that reasonsmorality are explained by morality being in force for us and that this 
involves us taking morality seriously as a system of rules governing practical behavior. 
     Moreover, the explanation of why we take morality seriously may itself be explained by the 
properties which fix the moral standard. For example, some of us take morality seriously as a 
system of rules governing practical behavior because we take immorality as indicative of a lack 
of empathy for others. This doesn’t imply any sort of objectionable fetishism. 
     On the other hand, it would be costly if my account ruled out δ-fetishism entirely. Fetishistic 
concern with obeying a standard is possible, actual, and even sometimes desirable. Our 
distinctively bureaucratic reasons are a bit like this; having spent time in bureaucratic anarchy 
long ago convinced me that fetishistic concern with bureaucratic procedure can be good for a 
community.48 
 
n.5 Conclusion 
Our distinctive reasons to do as we oughtδ are totally explained by δ being one of our normative 
standards. We have such distinctive reasons to be polite, moral, prudent, and even to play pool 
                                                47	See	Svavarsdottir	(1999:	§6)	for	a	useful	overview	and	trenchant	criticism.	
48	Thanks	to	Jamie	Dreier	and	Geoffrey	Sayre-McCord	for	discussion	of	this	worry	for	my	account.		
  
correctly. The structure of our explanation of reasonsδ, for each standard δ, is the same, whether 
δ is traditionally substantive or merely formal.     
     Importantly, my account explains how both morality and etiquette plays their actual role in 
guiding behavior, informing our practices of kudos and sanction, and regulating normative 
deliberation. It shows how clear conflict between different normative systems is sometimes 
resolvable, avoiding some worrisome normative dualisms. So long as we’ve enough respect for 
morality, etiquette, and prudence—as I hope and believe we do—this account looks tidy, 
informative, and accurate to Foot’s point about the seriousness of formal obligation, moral or 
otherwise. If morality is also substantive, the major difference between it and etiquette is that I’ll 
have generic reason to ψ just because I oughtmorality ψ. But there will also be reasonsmorality to ψ. 
So regardless of what else you believe about morality and other putatively substantive standards, 
we should all recognize formally normative standards and their corresponding reasonsδ. 
     But, given all this, why we should continue to believe that some standards are substantive? 
Why aren’t reasonsδ enough? After all, we already accept instrumental generic reasons to ψ and 
generic reasons to ψ. Since we take morality seriously, we also have reasonsmorality to do as 
morality commands. So we’ll often have reasonsmoral, on top of generic and instrumental reasons, 
to do as morality directs. Given the tidy package these three kinds of reasons comprise, why ask 
for more? 
     My account raises a serious challenge for any theorist who accepts that some systems of 
norms are substantive: find some role for the generic reasons of substantive domains which can’t 
be subsumed under a plausible account of generic reasons to take morality seriously as a 
normative standard. I bet any remaining interesting distinctions between putatively substantive 
obligations and merely formal obligations can be reduced to a distinction between our reasonsδ 
or our generic reasons to take δ seriously. But I’ll leave selling that wager to another occasion. 
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